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I. Abstract 
 
 Criminal justice reform is increasingly becoming a hot-button issue in public opinion 
discourse in the United States. This new wave of reforms is a response to decades of punitive 
policies that led to massive increases in US incarceration rates. In this thesis, I address one such 
policy: the lifetime ban on access to welfare benefits (TANF) and food stamps (SNAP) for drug 
felons after release from prison, passed as part of the welfare reforms of 1996. I collected data 
from states’ corrections departments in order to study the relationship between a given state’s 
level of implementation of the ban and its recidivism rates. I first perform a bivariate analysis of 
the aggregated recidivism data; then, I individually analyze six states (Alabama, California, 
Indiana, Massachusetts, New York, and Washington) to determine the effects of the TANF and 
SNAP bans. The limited nature of accessible criminal justice data did not allow me to find a 
causal relationship between these variables, but my results do suggest that more lenient public 
assistance accessibility for released offenders may be correlated with declines in recidivism 
rates. 
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II. Background 
         The United States has reached a critical moment in the way in which we handle issues of 
criminal justice. A system of mass incarceration has been steadily growing over the past few 
decades, and statistics about the state of the US prison system often seem almost too staggering 
to be true: 
● The US accounts for 5% of the world’s total population, but roughly 25% of the world’s 
prison population (Lee, 2015). 
● In 2015, one in every 115 American adults was in prison or jail (The Sentencing Project, 
2017). 
● The size of the prison and jail population has risen over 500% over the past 40 years 
(The Sentencing Project, 2019). 
The situation is even more troubling when we consider the systematic racism of the criminal 
justice system: 
● While people of color account for about 30% of the US population, they represent 
roughly 60% of the incarcerated population (Kerby, 2012). 
● Of all prisoners incarcerated for drug offenses, Black and Latino people comprise almost 
60% of those in state prison and nearly 80% of those in federal prison (Drug Policy 
Alliance, 2019). 
● If African-Americans and Hispanics were arrested at the same rate as whites, prison and 
jail populations would decline by almost 40% (NAACP, 2019). 
How did we end up here, and what can we do moving forward? 
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A. A Brief History of Mass Incarceration 
         The rise of mass incarceration in the United States is most commonly traced back to the 
mid-1960s to early 1970s, with the genesis of “tough on crime” ideology (Cullen, 2018). 
Criminal justice scholars often argue that this ideology arose as a racist backlash from many 
white Americans and politicians to the progress made during the Civil Rights Movement 
(Newell, 2013); research has demonstrated that increases in punitive attitudes can be at least 
partially explained by anxieties surrounding large scale social changes (Tyler & Boeckmann, 
1997; Leverentz, 2012). In practice, “tough on crime” has implicitly meant and continues to 
implicitly mean tough on people of color, particularly African-Americans. Black people, and 
black men specifically, have been subject to stereotyping as criminal and dangerous by 
politicians, the media, and the public, which, for many white Americans, justifies their 
imprisonment and other forms of state violence against them (Oliver, 2003). Jonathan Simon of 
the Vera Institute for Justice writes, “[It] is unlikely that the dehumanization of prisoners under 
mass incarceration would have been as politically sustainable without the lack of empathy and 
human connection that, more than positive discrimination, is the cutting edge of racism” (2014). 
Furthermore, in addition to the creation of “tough on crime” ideology, the Nixon administration 
first launched the war on drugs, which established harsher regulations and sentencing policy 
surrounding illegal (nonviolent) drug use (Lopez, 2016). It was during this period that 
incarceration rates first began their upward trend (Cullen, 2018). 
         However, incarceration began to rise exponentially during the Reagan era of the 1980s, 
when “tough on crime” took shape not just as a mentality, but as a set of policies that drastically 
increased the prison population. The most significant piece of criminal justice legislation that 
emerged from Reagan’s administration was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (John, 2014). In 
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addition to providing funding for new prison construction and drug education, it most 
notoriously created mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes, which transferred authority 
from judges to prosecutors in determining defendant sentences, and increased average prison 
time for those convicted of drug offenses (Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, 2019). A 2006 
report by the ACLU notes the discriminatory effects of the law’s differential treatment of 
powdered and crack cocaine: it established a “100-to-1 disparity between distribution of powder 
and crack cocaine” (ACLU, 2006). Because crack cocaine is cheaper, it was much more 
accessible to poor, black communities.  As a result, many black Americans faced significantly 
harsher sentences and longer prison time than white Americans for using the same drug. Higher 
rates of policing in communities of color compounded this effect. 
         While popularized by conservatives like Nixon and Reagan, tough on crime policies and 
the war on drugs also gained significant support from Democrats during this period and into the 
1990s. Notably, an oft-cited reason for Michael Dukakis’s loss to George W. Bush in the 1988 
presidential election was the Willie Horton television advertisement, run by an independent 
expenditure group on behalf of Bush’s campaign. Horton was an African-American convicted 
murderer, who, while on release from a furlough program in Massachusetts, attacked a white 
couple, raping the woman and binding and stabbing her boyfriend (Baker, 2018). Dukakis was 
the governor of Massachusetts at the time of this attack. The ad preyed on white fears of black 
male violence, and, in particular, its perceived threat to white female fragility, sometimes known 
as the “they’re raping our women” mentality. By accusing Dukakis of being soft on crime (and 
implicitly, soft on black crime) Bush gained a large increase in public support for his candidacy 
(Baker, 2018). By the next election cycle, Democrats had learned their lesson, and Bill Clinton 
campaigned and secured office by firmly positioning himself as a tough on crime candidate. 
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          In 1994, under the Clinton administration, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control 
and Enforcement Act, which included a range of provisions that increased the rate of 
incarceration even further. For one, it expanded authorized use of the death penalty for both 
existing and newly created federal crimes (Chettier & Eisen, 2016). The bill also created a 
federal “three strikes” provision, which stipulated that defendants would receive a mandatory life 
sentence if convicted of a “serious violent felony” following two or more prior convictions, at 
least one of which was also a serious violent felony (Harris, 1995). Finally, the bill granted states 
$12.5 billion for prison construction if they adopted “truth in sentencing” laws, under which 
inmates were required to serve at least 85% of their assigned sentences. Punitive reforms in 
criminal justice also flourished at the state level, with many states adopting even stricter “three 
strikes” provisions, establishing mandatory minimums, and removing judicial discretion in the 
sentencing process (Chettier & Eisen, 2016). These policies increased average sentence lengths, 
particularly for nonviolent drug offenses, and took away judges’ ability to allow leniency based 
on the specific circumstances of the offense. Overall, these trends in sentencing laws continued 
into the 2000s, with mass incarceration rates reaching their peak at 1,000 inmates per 100,000 
adults in 2008, and exhibiting moderate decline since then (Gramlich, 2018). 
B. Evidence of Mass Incarceration’s Failure 
         In general, the mindset that created mass incarceration in the US seems to reflect 
Americans’ knee-jerk reaction to crime. When someone has broken a law, our cultural mindset 
tells us that the correct response is to punish them for what they’ve done. For many people, this 
eye-for-an-eye response seems intuitive. Particularly in cases of violent crime, it is difficult to 
imagine that we should treat someone who has broken our societal codes or hurt someone else 
with respect and forgiveness. 
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However, study after study demonstrates the failure of the punishment mentality on 
multiple levels. For one, mass incarceration policies have not been found to reduce crime rates, 
which is purportedly their main purpose. Research demonstrates that since the 1990s, mass 
incarceration accounted for almost zero percent of the decline in crime rates; moreover, this 
already small effect diminishes even further as incarceration levels increase (Equal Justice 
Initiative, 2017; Stemen, 2017). Mass incarceration has also had an insidious effect on families 
and communities, particularly those of color. More than one in 12 American children have 
experienced parental incarceration at some point in their lives, and the consequences of parental 
incarceration include childhood depression, anxiety, aggression, and delinquency (Gotsch, 2018). 
When already poor communities are affected by mass incarceration, their economic prospects 
and outcomes deteriorate further. The formerly incarcerated have fewer job prospects, and the 
prospects they do have are most often in low-skill, low-paying jobs. When people are removed 
from their families by incarceration, they lose their ability to support them financially; further, 
community businesses lose the support of many of their patrons, which hinders the growth of the 
local economy (Clear, 2008). A criminal record also makes it much more difficult for people to 
find housing, and sometimes even public housing is denied on this basis (Childress, 2014). In 
addition to the detrimental societal implications of mass incarceration policies, they have failed 
to accomplish even the baseline goal of preventing offenders from reoffending post-release, as I 
will later discuss in further detail.  
C. A Shift from Punishment to Rehabilitation          
         Given that mass incarceration policies have largely failed to accomplish their goals, the 
US has now reached a point at which politicians of both parties and the general public are 
changing their positions on crime and criminal justice issues. One recent nationally 
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representative survey by the Vera Institute of Justice found that a majority of respondents 
supported community-based substance abuse and mental health treatment, as well as investing in 
community-based programs for violence reduction; only a minority of respondents backed the 
construction of more prisons and jails (2018). At the federal and state level, even conservative 
politicians, who were the driving force behind the original tough on crime initiatives, have come 
forward in support of significant criminal justice reforms. In December 2018, the First Step Act 
was signed into law at the federal level, with Congress and the presidency both in Republican 
hands. Some of its provisions include permitting early release for good behavior or participation 
in vocational and rehabilitative programs, allowing greater judicial discretion for certain crimes 
with mandatory minimum sentences, easing the “three strikes” rule in certain cases such that 
offenders receive 25 years in prison instead of life sentences, and making retroactive the reforms 
of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Lopez, 2018). This bill received bipartisan support, and, as 
Washington Post columnist Katrina vanden Heuvel notes, was one of the only policies for which 
President Trump “received a rare bit of bipartisan applause” in his 2019 State of the Union 
address (vanden Heuvel, 2019). 
         While we might expect more liberal blue states to be further ahead of the curve on 
criminal justice reforms, many typically conservative states have passed progressive reforms in 
recent years as well. This is true of even the very most conservative states in the country.  For 
instance, in 2010, Alabama increased judicial discretion in responding to technical parole 
violations (Bellamy et al., 2012). In 2008, Mississippi allowed parole eligibility for all inmates 
convicted of nonviolent felonies after serving 25% of their sentence; this provision was also 
applied retroactively (Bellamy et al., 2012). In 2007, Texas passed a reform bill that made 
massive changes to its juvenile justice system, including offering several rehabilitative 
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alternatives to incarceration, increasing juvenile correction officer training, preventing juveniles 
convicted of misdemeanors from being placed in juvenile facilities, etc. (Bellamy et al., 2012). 
Some of the conservative rationales for criminal justice reform include reducing the size of the 
government, cutting exorbitant spending on prisons and jails, and preserving family structure 
(Right on Crime, 2019). Whatever the reasoning behind reform, it is becoming clear to both 
parties that the current system is ineffective, and that we must figure out new ways to handle 
criminal justice.  
D. Rethinking Recidivism and Our Treatment of Released Offenders 
         Within the broader context of mass incarceration, this thesis focuses particularly on 
recidivism rates, and whether public assistance availability has an effect on those rates. Similar 
to prison sentence reforms, the notion of providing public assistance to criminal offenders runs 
against a natural human instinct toward punishment. However, there is reason to think that it 
might have a salutary effect. Specifically, I ask: Does greater access to public assistance after 
release from prison contribute to lower state recidivism rates?  
         One major consequence of mass incarceration and the war on drugs is the difficulty that 
many ex-offenders face when reentering civil society after release from prison. In particular, this 
problem may be exacerbated by the effects of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), a welfare reform bill passed in 1996, which imposed a lifetime 
ban on access to welfare benefits (TANF) and food stamps (SNAP) for those convicted of a 
drug-related felony (Hager, 2016). Felony drug charges include possession over a certain amount 
(the amount being dependent on the drug schedule), possession with intent to distribute, actual 
distribution, drug trafficking, and drug possession near a restricted area, such as school grounds 
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(Clarke, 2018). In the decades that have followed, states have had the choice to maintain these 
bans, modify them, or opt out of them entirely. 
Currently, thirteen states remain with the full lifetime ban on welfare fully in place, and 
six states with the lifetime food stamps ban (Hager, 2016). Most commonly, states have a 
modified or partial ban in place on these benefits. However, what these partial ban policies look 
like can vary widely from state to state. Examples include the existence of waiting periods before 
released felons are granted access to government benefits, restricted access to benefits for only 
those enrolled in substance abuse treatment programs, and bans only applying to those convicted 
of certain more serious offenses, such as manufacturing or distributing drugs (Mauer & 
McCalmont, 2013). For instance, in North Carolina, those convicted of lesser drug felonies are 
disqualified from food stamp access for six months after release from prison, while those 
convicted of a Class G felony in North Carolina or any drug felony outside the state are still 
subject to the lifetime ban (Barrett, 2015). 
         If being barred, fully or partially, from access to government assistance is in fact 
contributing to higher prison recidivism rates—as some past research has already 
demonstrated—those effects are worth studying for a few reasons. First, recidivism rates are 
extremely high in the United States, and contribute significantly to the problem of mass 
incarceration. Currently, 2.3 million Americans are held in the criminal justice system, while 
only 626,000 prisoners are released every year (Wagner & Sawyer, 2018). Estimates range, but 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics approximates that 56.7% of released prisoner will be re-arrested 
within one year after release, 67.8% within three years, and 76.6% within five years (Durose et 
al., 2014). Rates of return to prison—for committing a parole violation or a new offense that 
results in conviction—are 49.7% within three years of release and 55.1% within five years 
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(Durose et al., 2014). Further, recidivism is extremely costly to federal and state governments. A 
report by the Pew Center on the States found that if the 41 states analyzed were able to cut 
recidivism rates by 10%, they would save more than $635 million in averted prison costs in the 
first year alone (2011). Finally, we should be concerned about high recidivism rates and their 
causes, because, despite the period in the late 20th century for which punishment was a major 
focus, the goal of the American justice system for much of its history has been prisoner 
rehabilitation (Butterfield, 2001). Ex-offenders should theoretically be able to successfully 
reenter society without substantial, systematic barriers that push them back into the criminal 
justice system. The purpose of this thesis is thus to address what factors do or do not contribute 
to states’ recidivism rates, and therefore to potentially also empirically guide criminal justice and 
public assistance policy decisions. 
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III. Literature Review 
A. Post-Release Risk Factors for Offenders 
         First, my research and hypotheses find their basis in the considerable social science 
research on risk factors for recidivism. Major risk factors include food insecurity and lack of 
social support, both of which can force a return to criminal activity among those recently 
released. To begin, I look to past research on the relationship between food insecurity and risk-
taking behavior. 
Wang et al. specifically examine the relationship between food insecurity and HIV risk 
behaviors among released offenders (2013). Their study utilizes a representative sample of the 
offender population in three states with different levels of SNAP ban implementation: Texas (full 
lifetime ban), California (modified ban, under which the lifetime ban only applies to those who 
have committed certain higher level drug felonies and have not yet completed a drug treatment 
program), and Connecticut (no ban, except for offenders who do not comply with their court 
sentence). In surveying their sample, they find that 91% of respondents reported experiencing 
food insecurity generally, and 37% reported not having eaten for at least one day within the past 
month. However, they did not find evidence to support the hypothesis that systemic food 
insecurity was correlated with HIV risk behaviors.  
On the other hand, their results did demonstrate that participants who went without food 
for at least one day were more likely to use alcohol, heroin, and cocaine prior to sex, and to 
exchange sex for money, than those who had at least one meal per day. Consequently, this study 
serves as potential evidence for the idea that the economic barriers associated with reentry can 
lead to more risk-taking and illegal behaviors.  Additionally, Bingwanger et al. present research 
that further establishes the risk that prisoners face in the period immediately post-release (2007). 
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In a cohort study of all inmates released from the Washington State Department of Corrections 
from 1999 to 2003, they find that the risk of death is 3.5 times higher among released inmates 
than among the general population; in the first two weeks post-release, that risk of death was 
12.7 times higher among released inmates. The leading causes of ex-offender death include drug 
overdose, homicide, and suicide; these findings suggest that a lack of social supports leave the 
formerly incarcerated vulnerable to returning to substance abuse and violence. 
B. Economic Conditions and Crime 
A moderate body of research exists on the impact of general economic conditions on 
crime and recidivism rates. In general, there seem to be mixed results as to whether economic 
conditions have significant effects on crime or recidivism rates. A discussion of the literature on 
this topic follows.   
Mustard provides a summary of recent research on the relationship between labor market 
conditions and crime rates (2010). While some research finds no suspected causal relationship, 
research that uses more robust research techniques—such as the use of data at local levels, panel 
data, and/or a broader array of measures (other than just unemployment rates) to capture labor 
market conditions—have generally found significant relationships between improved job market 
conditions and diminishing crime rates (or vice versa). Specifically, in some instances, these 
effects have been found to be the most significant for property crimes and drug offenses. Along 
those lines, Fougere et al.’s research finds that, in France, youth unemployment induces 
increases in the crime rate; in particular, this effect is causal for burglaries, thefts, and drug 
offenses (2009). As such, there is some evidence to suggest that the likelihood of finding a job 
post-release and the probability of reoffending may be causally linked. 
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Apart from general labor market conditions, research also suggests that ex-offender status 
in particular can affect an individual’s likelihood of being hired. The National Institute of Justice 
(NIJ) reports that between 60 and 75% of those released from prison are unemployed during the 
first year after release (2011). Further, they find that most employers are reluctant or unwilling to 
hire individuals with criminal records; one specific study in New York City found that having a 
criminal record reduced the probability of a callback or job offer from an employer by 50%. This 
impact was compounded by racial effects—the penalty suffered by black ex-offenders was about 
twice the size of that suffered by white ex-offenders.   
On the other hand, some researchers contest the notion that economic conditions and job 
opportunities influence prisoner recidivism. For instance, Freeman studies the relationship 
between the characteristics of people released from prison and their performance in the labor 
market (2003). Although he, too, finds that ex-offenders do not perform well in the labor market 
at least in part due to employer preferences and certain legal restrictions on hiring, he also shows 
that ex-offenders, on average, complete less education, demonstrate lower literacy rates, are 
more likely to have serious physical and mental health problems, and tend to exhibit more 
aggressive and socially unacceptable behaviors, all of which contribute to higher rates of 
recidivism independently of labor market conditions. Freeman’s research thus suggests that 
government intervention and social supports may not affect recidivism rates if certain individual 
traits in offenders are more powerful contributors to the likelihood of reoffending. 
While some research does not go so far as to say that economic factors are unimportant, it 
does suggest that recidivism rates might be more dependent on income available in specific 
industries than the availability of earnings or income as a whole. For instance, in a study on 
recidivism rates and labor market opportunities for released prisoners in California, Schnepel 
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finds that increases in construction and manufacturing hires (one extra hire per 1,000-working 
age individuals) led to 1.8% and 1% decreases in recidivism, respectively. In contrast, all other 
low-wage industries (including food services, retail, admin/waste, etc.) saw no significant effects 
on recidivism with job growth (2016). Moreover, the effects of economic opportunities and job 
placement have been found to have differential effects depending on the age of the released 
offender, with older released prisoners reporting more significant decreases in crime and re-
arrest rates than those in their teenage years or early twenties (Uggen, 2000).  Thus, in my 
research, I hope to contribute to and clarify this literature by determining the impact of available 
income on recidivism rates. 
C. Does Public Assistance Affect Recidivism? 
The research discussed above is relevant for establishing recidivism risk factors and the 
potential for economic conditions to affect crime and recidivism rates. However, there are two 
major studies in particular that directly address my research question, i.e., whether released drug 
offenders’ level of access to food stamps and welfare affect recidivism rates. While Yang finds 
significant effects of the PRWORA ban on recidivism rates, Luallen et al. finds that the effects of 
the ban are not significant (Yang, 2017; Luallen et al., 2018). 
First, notably, Yang published pioneering research on this topic, regarding the effects of 
the PRWORA policies on drug offender outcomes (2017). Using data from 1992 to 2014, Yang 
compares one-year recidivism rates among drug offenders in states with the full ban, a modified 
ban, and no ban relative to nondrug offenders, as well as relative to the drug offender mean. She 
uses the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) data, and 
after dropping states for which data is incomplete, she analyzes 43 states. She finds that any 
eligibility for welfare and food stamps, but in particular full eligibility, substantially decreases 
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drug offender recidivism among those recently released from prison. Specifically, she looks at 
drug offender recidivism rates compared to non-drug offenders’ rates and finds that, when no 
ban is implemented, the drug offender mean decreases relative to the rest of the released 
population. However, Yang does not separate the different types of partial eligibility or their 
effects, instead grouping all types of modified bans into that category. 
In contrast, Luallen et al. find that the PRWORA ban’s implementation status does not 
affect recidivism rates. Their research also uses NCRP data from 1996 to 2014, but, in contrast to 
Yang, they only analyze six states; their explanation for this more limited analysis is that only 
California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, and Minnesota have data extending back to 1996 
for which impact estimates are possible. The key difference between their analysis and Yang’s is 
that instead of using drug offender recidivism rates specifically as the dependent variable, they 
analyze the impact of the ban’s implementation status on state recidivism rates and the size of the 
prison population. Thus, the focus of this paper is slightly different, in that it is not focused 
specifically on whether drug offender recidivism is affected by drug offender eligibility for food 
stamps and welfare; rather, they are interested in whether the ban has had a significant effect on 
recidivism rates or mass incarceration rates as a whole. Overall, they find no meaningful 
differences in recidivism rates or shifts in the size of the prison population at different levels of 
PWORA ban implementation. Going forward, I hope to situate my research in the context of 
Yang and Luallen et al.’s work to establish whether access to welfare and food stamps has a 
meaningful impact on recidivism. 
         Additionally, evidence suggests that not just a source of income, but also the level of 
income received, can affect recidivism rates. However, some research also contests the idea that 
income level impacts recidivism rates. A discussion of that literature follows. 
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         Notably, Agan and Makowsky study the impact of area minimum wages, prisoner 
eligibility for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and the dollar amount of the EITC on 
recidivism rates. Also using NCRP data, they analyze the effects of federal and state wage 
increases and state EITC program changes from 2000 to 2014. Their research finds that the 
minimum wage has significant effects on prisoner recidivism: an average minimum wage 
increase of $1 reduces rates of 1-year recidivism by 3.5% for ex-offenders. Further, they find that 
increases in the availability and amount of the EITC have similar effects, but only for female 
offenders. This study is important for my research because it establishes that increases in 
earnings can decrease recidivism. 
         Additionally, Mallar and Thornton present data from a controlled experiment run in 
Baltimore in the 1970s by the US Department of Labor that informs the research on the 
relationship between personal finances and recidivism rates (1978). After randomly assigning a 
sample of men with high probabilities of reoffending to treatment or control groups, the results 
of the study demonstrate that those who were provided with financial aid—in the amount of a 
$60 stipend per week for three months—were significantly less likely to commit property crime 
recidivism. However, while the provision of a financial stipend was successful, the treatment 
group which was placed into a job placement program did not experience any significant 
reductions in recidivism. Thus this study suggests that some forms of financial assistance are 
effective in reducing recidivism while others are not. 
However, there has also been considerable doubt cast on the notion that economic 
rehabilitation programs within or after release from prison have a significant effect on recidivism 
rates. Orsagh and White analyze past research efforts on this topic using both aggregate and 
individual level data (1981). They present evidence that research using aggregate data finds 
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weak, if any, support for the supposed relationship between unemployment rates and crime. 
Further, while they admit that individual level data is slightly more supportive, the notion that 
higher income is correlated or causally linked with lower crime rates is still only weakly 
supported.  
         Finally, I am interested in looking at different modifications of the PRWORA, some of 
which have been discussed more generally in social science research. For instance, part of the 
modification of the PRWORA ban in certain states requires the completion of substance abuse 
programs and/or regularly scheduled drug tests; I am interested in looking at the effect of this 
type of ban on recidivism rates. Some research suggests that drug courts—which “enhance and 
monitor the delivery of treatment services” to substance abusers as well as hold offenders 
responsible for compliance—reduce re-arrest rates relative to similar offenders not enrolled in 
the program (NC Court System; US Government Accountability Office, 2011; Gifford et al., 
2014). Thus, my research will contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of drug treatment 
or drug testing stipulations for ex-offenders. Furthermore, in some states, the ban denies ex-
felons benefits for a set time period post-release, after which, they are again eligible for those 
benefits. However, research has also suggested that the risk of recidivism is highest in the year 
after release (Binswanger et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2016). Consequently, I look to study the 
effects of a ban on welfare and food stamps during that identified critical period for released drug 
felons. 
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V. Data and Methodology 
A. Data Collection  
         The data used for the independent (PROWRA ban implementation status) and dependent 
variable (state recidivism rates) of this study were largely drawn from states’ departments of 
corrections and states’ congressional records.  
The National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP), administered by the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics (BJS), assembles datasets based on recidivism data that is voluntarily reported 
by states’ corrections departments. Unfortunately, these datasets were restricted-use, and I was 
not able to access them for this project. However, many states made this recidivism data publicly 
accessible on their corrections department websites, records, and/or news releases; as such, I was 
able to manually collect this publicly accessible data and create my own panel dataset. This stage 
was by far the most time-intensive portion of my data collection process. In order to include as 
wide a range of states and years in my analysis as possible, I selected the definition of recidivism 
that seemed to be most commonly used and made available by corrections departments: return to 
prison within a three-year period after release. All of the corrections department data that I was 
able to locate was released in web or pdf format, so my data collection involved manual 
transcription from its initial location into a useable format. When discussing recidivism data, the 
reference year is the year of release from prison. For example, a 40% recidivism rate with the 
reference year 2005 would mean that 40% of offenders released in 2005 returned to prison, either 
due to a new offense or a parole violation, within the three subsequent years.  
         Determining the status of the PRWORA ban in each state involved qualitative research 
into state laws and policy. If a state modified the ban or opted out of it completely, state 
legislative records show when the change to the ban was passed and the effective date of the 
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change. I was able to determine ban status based on news articles on changes made to the law, 
past research on PROWRA and its impact on drug offenders, and directly through state 
legislative records.  
B. Data Limitations 
 Due to the restrictions on available data, the scope of this project had to be scaled back 
significantly from my initial expectations. For instance, I was not able to assemble a consistent 
timeframe for analysis, because corrections departments’ websites began collecting data or 
making data available in different years and for different periods. For instance, Washington has 
recidivism data dating back to 1991, but the most recent available year is 2009; on the other 
hand, Georgia does not have recidivism data available until 2005, but offers data up until 2015. 
Further, these states are both examples with a substantial number of years of data. Of the total 50 
states, only 36 had made any recidivism data public through their corrections websites, records, 
and/or news releases. Further, among those states, several had an extremely limited range of 
years available, specifically: Connecticut only had data for 2004, 2005, and 2008; Michigan only 
had data for 1995, 2010, and 2014; Mississippi only had data available for 2012; and Tennessee 
only had data available for 2007 and 2013. Consequently, a multivariate regression analysis, 
which was my original plan for research design, was not possible due to the fragmented nature of 
the data. 
C. Methodology 
 Given the restrictions on data access and the lack of publicly accessible data for a 
consistent set of years, identifying a causal relationship is not feasible. However, I still seek to 
offer a meaningful analysis of the correlational relationship—or lack thereof—between TANF 
and SNAP access for released drug felons and state-level recidivism rates.  
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Thus, the first portion of my data analysis is a bivariate regression analysis of recidivism 
rates over time, separated into categories for ban implementation status. Because of the limited 
number of observations with partial or modified bans, I analyze two groups of states: those that 
have the full ban, and those that opted out, be it partially or fully. I perform this analysis for the 
TANF ban and the SNAP ban separately. Further, I created a categorical index variable that 
combines level of implementation for both bans, with the three categories being: the state left 
both bans in place, the state opted out of one ban either partially or fully but kept the other ban 
completely in place, or the state opted either partially or fully out of both bans.  
Following this aggregate analysis, I will look at the particular ban policies of different 
states and trends in those states’ recidivism rates over time. The states for which I will perform 
this analysis are: Alabama, California, Indiana, Massachusetts, New York, and Washington. I 
selected these states partially because they have some of the longest periods for which recidivism 
rate data is available, and additionally because I found them to be representative of other states 
with similar ban policies. A further discussion of the selection criteria and the state-specific ban 
policies follows in my results section.  
D. Controls 
 Had more publicly accessible and consistent recidivism data been available, my analysis 
would have included regressions that controlled for some of the other factors that contribute to 
changes in the recidivism rate. In the end, such analysis was not feasible, but as part of this 
project I had collected control variable data that I was subsequently not able to use in my 
analysis. A discussion of these control variables and their potential effects follows.  
 First, a significant contributing factor to a state’s total prison population is its racial 
demographics. As discussed in the background and literature review of this paper, people of 
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color, particularly black people, are arrested and incarcerated at significantly higher rates than 
white people are. This outcome stems from laws and policies that are specifically targeted at 
poor people and people of color, as well as the fact that poorer neighborhoods, particularly those 
of color, tend to be over-policed relative to more affluent and/or whiter communities. As such, I 
would expect that states with higher black and Hispanic populations would have generally higher 
recidivism rates; further, I would expect that states for which the size of the black and/or 
Hispanic populations are increasing would demonstrate concurrent increases in their recidivism 
rates. The US Census has yearly estimates on states’ total population sizes as well as specific 
demographic information.  
 Further, I posit that general economic conditions would affect recidivism rates, given that 
worse economic conditions mean fewer jobs in general. In particular, the difficulty that released 
felons face in acquiring employment would likely be exacerbated by an environment in which 
firms are hiring fewer people in general or laying off employees. In my data collection, I had 
hoped to capture this effect with annual state level unemployment data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. I expect that recidivism rates may be at least positively weakly correlated with 
unemployment rates over time. Moreover, significant changes in unemployment rates can 
demonstrate when large economic shocks have occurred, as with the 2008 financial crisis. 
Significant spikes in recidivism rates could potentially be explained by economic shocks that 
force people to return to the informal or illegal sector for work that is no longer available in the 
formal sector.  
 In a multivariate analysis, I would also hope to capture not just the effect of level of 
access to public assistance programs, but also if the amount of assistance that an individual is 
eligible to receive affects recidivism rates. In order to determine level of social spending in each 
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state, I used data from the Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances administered 
by the US Census. The variable of interest in this data is Public Welfare, which is comprised of 
total state spending on Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF), and Medical Assistance Program (Medicaid). While Medicaid is clearly not 
the social assistance program in question, this variable was the closest I could find to capturing 
level of social spending. I divided this total by US Census state population estimates for each 
year in order to determine social welfare spending per capita and approximate the income that an 
individual using TANF and/or SNAP would receive.  
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V. Theory 
 My primary hypothesis for the results of my data analysis is that states that opt out of the 
bans on welfare and food stamps (either fully or partially) will experience more significant 
reductions in their recidivism rates over time than states that leave the bans in place. This 
hypothesis is based on the research discussed in the literature review, both on the specific impact 
of the PRWORA ban as well as levels of economic and social access post-release more 
generally.  
Specifically, there are a few causal mechanisms that I believe would produce this 
relationship between the PRWORA ban and recidivism rates. For one, as discussed in the 
introduction and literature review, being released from prison even with full access to 
government benefits presents multiple barriers to successful reentry into society: most employers 
are significantly less likely to hire someone with a criminal record, particularly if that record 
contains a felony; released offenders are more likely to experience homelessness or lack of 
access to permanent housing; and many offenders face extreme difficulty socially reintegrating 
after being isolated from their families and communities while incarcerated, often for years or 
decades at a time (Western et al., 2015). Essentially, upon release, most offenders are already in 
a precarious position in which they have less access to traditional economic and social support 
systems.  
As such, I expect that, first, a lack of access to SNAP and TANF benefits would 
exacerbate the above effects. Specifically, as discussed in my literature review, being unable to 
access food in particular can result in risk-taking behavior, including a return to substance abuse. 
Further, I expect that being unable to access a source of legitimate income (through either formal 
employment or government assistance) would subsequently compel offenders to return to 
   26 
 
criminal activity. This outcome seems particularly likely among the population specifically 
targeted by PRWORA—drug felons—because drug felonies in particular are crimes related to 
income-producing activity, such as manufacturing or distribution.  
Additionally, I hypothesize that most states that opt out of the ban likely have more 
liberal criminal justice policy regarding other factors that contribute to recidivism, including, for 
example, more leniency when parole violations occur, more offender-friendly housing policy, 
“Ban the Box” policies which prohibit employers from making applicants indicate whether they 
have a criminal record on their initial application, etc. While the limitations of my analysis 
prohibit me from controlling for as many factors as I would like, including the potential effects 
of other criminal justice policies on recidivism rates, I expect to see trends in my state-specific 
analysis that indicate more lenient TANF and SNAP ban policy (potentially combined with other 
more liberal criminal justice policies in general) are correlated with declining recidivism rates 
over time.  
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VI. Results 
A. Bivariate Recidivism Analysis 
 The first portion of my results come from bivariate analyses of recidivism rates by year, 
with ban status as an explanatory variable. I performed three iterations of this analysis: first, with 
TANF ban status as the explanatory variable, second, with SNAP ban status as an explanatory 
variable, and finally, with the index measure combing TANF and SNAP ban status as the 
explanatory variable.  
 Table 1 below shows recidivism rates and their year-over-year change based on the status 
of the TANF ban, from 2000 to 2014. (There were not enough observations prior to 2000 or after 
2014 to justify including those years in this analysis). Clearly, this TANF analysis does not show 
consistent enough patterns in recidivism rates from which meaningful conclusions about the ban 
can be drawn. States drop in and out of this data, meaning that rates fluctuate over time not 
necessarily due to the ban, but also due to the addition or subtraction of a state’s recidivism rate 
in a given year.  
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Table 1: Recidivism Rates and Year-Over-Year Percentage Change, by TANF Ban 
Implementation Status  
 
Year Full Ban 
Year-Over-
Year 
Change 
Modified 
or No 
Ban 
Year-Over-
Year 
Change 
2000 0.32   0.48   
  n = 5 
 
n = 4   
2001 0.34 5.31% 0.47 -1.42% 
  n = 5 
 
n = 4   
2002 0.35 2.92% 0.45 -3.42% 
  n = 6 
 
n = 5   
2003 0.39 13.48% 0.44 -3.44% 
  n = 7 
 
n = 5   
2004 0.40 0.78% 0.44 1.38% 
  n = 8 
 
n = 8   
2005 0.35 -10.57% 0.46 4.35% 
  n = 7 
 
n = 12   
2006 0.35 -2.42% 0.45 -3.55% 
  n = 7 
 
n = 13   
2007 0.33 -4.70% 0.43 -4.66% 
  n = 9 
 
n = 15   
2008 0.36 8.57% 0.40 -7.14% 
  n = 10 
 
n = 17   
2009 0.35 -2.76% 0.39 -2.00% 
  n = 10 
 
n = 16   
2010 0.35 0.23% 0.37 -4.47% 
  n = 10 
 
n = 16   
2011 0.35 1.24% 0.37 -0.29% 
  n = 10 
 
n = 16   
2012 0.36 0.70% 0.34 -7.03% 
  n = 10 
 
n = 16   
2013 0.33 -6.19% 0.35 3.00% 
  n = 9 
 
n = 14   
2014 0.29 -12.59% 0.33 -6.36% 
  n = 8   n = 8   
 
 In Table 2, which shows recidivism rates and their year-over-year change based on SNAP 
ban implementation status, the results are similar to those found in Table 1. Again, for both 
categories—states with the full SNAP ban and states who have opted out of it to some degree—
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rates fluctuate widely year-to-year because of data limitations.  States and their recidivism rates 
are entering in and falling out of the analysis because data are available some years but not 
others. 
Table 2: Recidivism Rates and Year-Over-Year Percentage Change, by SNAP Ban 
Implementation Status 
 
Year Full Ban 
Year-
Over-
Year 
Change 
Modified 
or No 
Ban 
Year-
Over-
Year 
Change 
2000 0.32   0.48   
  n = 5 
 
n = 4   
2001 0.34 5.31% 0.47 -1.42% 
  n = 5 
 
n = 4   
2002 0.35 2.92% 0.45 -3.42% 
  n = 6 
 
n = 5   
2003 0.39 13.48% 0.44 -3.44% 
  n  = 7 
 
n = 5   
2004 0.40 0.78% 0.46 4.46% 
  n = 8 
 
n = 9   
2005 0.35 -10.57% 0.47 2.99% 
  n = 7 
 
n = 13   
2006 0.35 -2.42% 0.45 -5.16% 
  n = 7 
 
n = 13   
2007 0.34 -2.21% 0.42 -5.78% 
  n = 8 
 
n = 17   
2008 0.33 -1.34% 0.41 -2.85% 
  n = 8 
 
n = 20   
2009 0.31 -8.04% 0.40 -3.00% 
  n = 7 
 
n = 19   
2010 0.31 0.23% 0.38 -4.80% 
  n = 7 
 
n = 20   
2011 0.31 1.27% 0.38 1.20% 
  n = 7 
 
n = 19   
2012 0.32 4.17% 0.36 -6.16% 
  n = 8 
 
n = 19    
2013 0.29 -11.23% 0.37 3.75% 
  n = 6 
 
n = 18   
2014 0.28 -1.45% 0.32 -13.01% 
  n  = 6   n = 11   
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 Finally, Table 3 shows recidivism rates and year-over-year change based on the index 
variable for combined TANF and SNAP ban implementation. This table also includes recidivism 
rates and year-over-year changes from 2000 to 2014. However, until 2007, there are no 
observations in the dataset for the middle category, which includes states who have one of the 
SNAP or TANF bans fully in place but have fully or partially opted out of the other. For all 
categories in this analysis, recidivism rates seem to be mainly declining year-to-year, with 
intermittent increases that are generally smaller than the decreases. Again, this result is not 
particularly illuminating, due to states dropping in and out of the analysis and the seemingly 
similar patterns across all levels of SNAP and TANF ban implementation.  
Given the limited nature of these aggregate-level analysis results, I now turn to specific 
states to analyze their recidivism trends over time and how they relate to their implementation of 
the PRWORA ban.  
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Table 3: Recidivism Rates and Year-Over-Year Percentage Change, Based on an Index for 
Combined SNAP and TANF Ban Implementation Status 
Year 
Full 
TANF 
and 
SNAP 
bans in 
place 
Year-
Over-
Year 
Change 
Opted out 
of one 
ban, kept 
other full 
ban 
Year-
Over-
Year 
Change 
Opted out 
(partially 
or fully) of 
both bans 
Year-
Over-
Year 
Change 
2000 0.32 
   
0.476   
  n = 5 
 
n = 0 
 
n = 4   
2001 0.34 5.31% 
  
0.46925 -1.42% 
  n = 5 
 
n = 0 
 
n = 4   
2002 0.35 2.92% 
  
0.4532 -3.42% 
  n == 6 
 
n = 0 
 
n = 5   
2003 0.39 13.48% 
  
0.4376 -3.44% 
  n = 7 
 
n = 0 
 
n = 5   
2004 0.40 0.78% 
  
0.4571111 4.46% 
  n = 8 
 
n = 0 
 
n = 9   
2005 0.35 -10.57% 
  
0.4707692 2.99% 
  n = 7 
 
n = 0 
 
n = 13   
2006 0.35 -2.42% 
  
0.4464615 -5.16% 
  n = 7 
 
n = 0 
 
n = 13   
2007 0.34 -2.21% 0.26 
 
0.4306271 -3.55% 
  n = 8 
 
n =1 
 
n = 16   
2008 0.33 -1.34% 0.46 
 
0.4034906 -6.30% 
  n = 8 
 
n = 2 
 
n = 18   
2009 0.31 -8.04% 0.44 -2% 0.4034906 0.00% 
  n = 7 
 
n = 3 
 
n = 16   
2010 0.31 0.23% 0.45 0% 0.3653676 -9.45% 
  n = 7 
 
n = 3 
 
n = 17   
2011 0.31 1.27% 0.45 1% 0.3689964 0.99% 
  n = 7 
 
n = 3 
 
n = 16   
2012 0.32 4.17% 0.44 -2% 0.3430539 -7.03% 
  n = 8 
 
n = 3 
 
n = 16   
2013 0.29 -11.23% 0.43 -3% 0.3611759 5.28% 
  n = 6 
 
n = 3 
 
n = 15   
2014 0.28 -1.45% 0.32 -26% 0.325321 -9.93% 
 
n = 6   n = 2   n = 9   
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B. State-Specific Analysis 
 The states analyzed in this section include Alabama, California, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, and Washington. 
i. Alabama 
 I selected Alabama for this analysis because it is one of the most conservative states for 
which recidivism data was made available. Alabama has a notably high incarceration rate—
higher than the US average, which is the highest in the world—at 946 incarcerated people per 
100,000 population, as of 2018 (Prison Policy Initiative, 2019).  
Specifically, Alabama kept the full TANF and SNAP bans in place until 2015, when it 
fully repealed both bans for drug felons (Hall, 2015). In the past few years, the Republican 
legislature in Alabama has implemented some other reforms, including sentencing reforms for 
nonviolent crimes in 2013, the creation of the Prison Reform Task Force in 2014, and expanding 
parole and supervision to reduce the number of people in prisons, also in 2014 (Jilani, 2017). 
However, for the time period for which recidivism data is available, Alabama was predominantly 
“tough on crime” and punitive in its criminal justice policy; the more recent reforms would not 
affect the outcomes depicted in Figure 1. 
Alabama’s recidivism data begins in 1997, with a rate of 25.30%, and ends in 2014 with 
a recidivism rate that is 5.3 percentage points higher, 31.50%.  
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Figure 1: Changes in Alabama’s Recidivism Rate over Time 
 
 As the graph suggests, Alabama’s recidivism rate was fairly volatile from 1997 to 2005, 
at which point it stabilized around 31-32%. Overall, in the time following the implementation of 
the TANF and SNAP bans in 1996, recidivism rates increased a bit from their original levels. 
Although there has seen a slight downward trend in the last decade, the rate of change has been 
exceedingly small. 
ii. California 
California, in contrast to Alabama, is a state that intuition would lead us to believe is 
more liberal on criminal justice policy, given its left-leaning track record on many other policy 
issues. However, as is emblematic of criminal justice issues generally until very recently, even 
liberal or left-leaning people often embraced “tough on crime” ideology, both due to public 
safety concerns and public opinion on crime. As such, though California has been implementing 
criminal justice reforms over the past few years, a large portion of its data reflects a more 
moderate, rather than liberal, stance on criminal justice issues.  
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California left the full ban on both SNAP and TANF benefits in place until 2004, from its 
start date in 1996. Further, it did not fully opt out of the federal ban until 2015 (Lyman, 2015). 
Effective 2005, California lifted the full ban and replaced it with a partial ban on access to 
assistance programs for released drug offenders; specifically, those convicted of felony drug 
possession became eligible to receive TANF and SNAP benefits as long as they participated in a 
substance abuse treatment program (California Welfare and Institutions Code § 18901.3). 
However, those convicted of selling, manufacturing, and/or importing drugs were still ineligible 
to receive benefits (Salladay & Rau, 2004). This change in TANF and SNAP ban policy is 
reflected by the dotted line in Figure 2 below.  
Figure 2: Changes in California’s Recidivism Rate over Time 
 
 As demonstrated in Figure 2, California has experienced a sharp decline in recidivism 
rates over the 11-year period for which it has data. Clearly, a significant drop in the rate occurs in 
2012, when it declines almost 20 percentage points from 44.6% in 2011 to 25% in 2012. The 
California Department of Corrections did not explain this decline in the recidivism rate or 
mention a change in how the rate was calculated, though that certainly could plausibly account 
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for some, if not most, of the decline in rates. Further, in 2011, California enacted the Public 
Safety Realignment bill, which was designed to significantly decrease the prison population with 
two major changes: first, most offenders convicted of non-serious, nonviolent, and non-sexual 
crimes would serve their sentences either in county jail or under probationary supervision instead 
of being incarcerated in state prisons, and second, most parole violators would not be re-
incarcerated for violations, but would instead serve time in county jails or face other sanctions 
(Lofstrom et al., 2016). Thus it follows that this law could account for the significant drop in 
rates of return to prison.  
However, even before the sharp drop in the rate in 2012, California’s recidivism rate had 
declined nearly every year since 2006, which corresponds roughly with the change in the public 
services ban. While naturally other confounding factors may explain some of this decline, and 
the change in regulation in 2011 may specifically explain the decline in the last four years of 
recidivism data, it does appear that recidivism began to decrease after some of the restrictions of 
the ban were lifted.  
iii. Indiana 
 I select Indiana as another example of conservative politics and criminal justice policy. It 
should help supplement the trends from Alabama, because while Indiana is also typically a 
Republican stronghold, it has a notably larger white population than Alabama; it also does not 
have the history of slavery and Jim Crow era policies that Alabama possesses and that have been 
demonstrably translated into racist criminal justice practices (Cox, 2015). This is not to say that 
criminal justice policy in Indiana does not perpetuate systemic racism, but Indiana’s history is 
less explicitly racist than that of Alabama and other states in the Deep South. Additionally, given 
that the punishments of the criminal justice system are nationally targeted much more heavily at 
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people of color, it would be fair to assume that a state with a higher black population, like 
Alabama, would have higher recidivism rates and potentially show less of a decline over time. 
Specifically, roughly a quarter of Alabama’s population is black (26.36%, as of the 2010 census), 
while less than 10% of Indiana’s population is black (9.33%, as of the 2010 census) (United 
States Census Bureau, 2016). 
 As of 2017, Indiana still had the full ban in place on access to both TANF and SNAP 
benefits for released drug felons (Federal Interagency Reentry Council, 2017; US Food and 
Nutrition Service, 2017).  
Figure 3: Changes in Indiana’s Recidivism Rate over Time 
 
 As demonstrated in Figure 3, Indiana’s recidivism rate has remained fairly constant for 
the 11-year period for which public data is available. The rate begins at 39.2% in 2002 and ends 
at 36.99% in 2013. This trend mirrors the trend in Alabama, which after a period of fluctuations, 
stabilized around 32% in 2005. Consequently, while recidivism rates in states with punitive 
TANF and SNAP policies may not be rising, they also do not exhibit decline demonstrated by 
more liberal states. 
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iv. Massachusetts 
 I use Massachusetts as another example of a socially liberal state with a long period of 
available recidivism data. As of 2018, Massachusetts’ total incarceration rate was less than half 
that of the average rate for the United States as a whole: Massachusetts incarcerated 324 people 
per 100,000 population, as compared to the 628 per 100,000 for the US (Prison Policy Inititative, 
2019).  
 Regarding TANF and SNAP ban policy, Massachusetts is similar to California in that it 
has fairly liberal accessibility for released drug felons, but perhaps less liberal than one would 
expect for a historically blue Northeastern state. Massachusetts kept both plans fully in place 
through 1999. In 2000, it fully opted out of the SNAP ban, meaning since then that all released 
drug felons have been eligible for food stamps. However, it only partially opted out of the TANF 
ban, with the restriction that felons must comply with substance abuse treatment programs to 
remain eligible. The policy changes made in 2000 are indicated by the dotted line in Figure 4 
below.  
Figure 4: Changes in Massachusetts’ Recidivism Rate over Time 
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 In 1997, Massachusetts’ recidivism rate was 41%, and dropped 9 percentage points over 
the course of 17 years, to 32% in 2014. However, following the modifications to the SNAP and 
TANF bans, Massachusetts’ recidivism rate actually began to increase before showing consistent 
decline beginning in 2009.  
v. New York 
 I select New York for this analysis because it is the largest state that did not enforce 
either ban for the entirety of its available recidivism data timeframe (Legal Action Center, 2009). 
New York, like California and Massachusetts, is a blue state that typically enforces liberal social 
policies. However, racial politics in New York, and particularly in New York City, may 
confound the effects of the liberal ban policy. Approximately 40% of New York’s population 
resides in New York City, and an additional 24% of the state’s residents live in the greater New 
York City metropolitan area (NYC Department of City Planning, 2019). During the 2002-2012 
period for which recidivism data is available, New York City somewhat notoriously enforced 
policing practices that systematically targeted people of color, particularly young men of color. 
As such, it is possible that over-policing and punitive incarceration policies unrelated to the ban 
affected recidivism rates during this period. 
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Figure 5: Changes in New York’s Recidivism Rate over Time 
 
 Clearly, New York does not exhibit the same downward trends in recidivism rates 
demonstrated by California and Massachusetts (as well as Washington, in the subsequent 
section). In fact, these results mirror those of Indiana, a state with much harsher restrictions for 
released drug felons. New York’s recidivism rate begins at 38.7% in 2002, and ends at 42.6% in 
2012; it fluctuates within this roughly four percentage point range for most of the 10-year period. 
This evidence suggests that the leniency in TANF and SNAP accessibility did not contribute to 
declining recidivism rates in New York; recidivism rates instead stayed roughly the same, with a 
very slight increase over this period.  
iv. Washington 
 Washington was selected for this analysis partially because it has recidivism data dating 
back to 1991, which is the earliest of all states in my dataset. As such, the recidivism data was 
available for two changes in Washington’s TANF and SNAP policies. First, in 1996, the bans 
were instituted at the federal level; Washington fully enforced both bans until 2004. Then, 
effective 2005, Washington opted out of the SNAP ban and enforced a partial ban on TANF 
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benefits, with the requirement that felons comply with the terms of their release and of their 
substance abuse program, if assigned (Legal Action Center, 2009).  
Figure 6: Changes in Washington’s Recidivism Rate over Time 
 
 In Figure 6, it appears that trends in Washington’s recidivism rate are correlated with 
changes in TANF and SNAP policies. The recidivism rate begins to increase following the 
implementation of the federal bans, beginning at 25.7% in 1996 and reaching its peak almost 10 
percentage points higher, at 35.8% in 2003. The rate declines slightly from 2003 to 34.4% in 
2004; following the state’s decision to fully opt out of the SNAP ban and partially out of the 
TANF ban in 2005, the rate has continued to decline. This result suggests that more lenient 
accessibility standards to public assistance for felons were correlated with declines in the 
recidivism rate. Further, seeing as this is the only state with reliable data pre-implementation of 
the federal ban, this result also suggests the possibility that these bans caused recidivism rates to 
increase once states adopted the policy. 
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VII. Discussion  
A. Implications of Results 
 While my research does not determine a causal relationship between drug felons’ level of 
access to TANF and SNAP programs and state recidivism rates, it does suggest that in some 
states, the two variables are correlated. In particular, Washington seems to be an illuminating 
example on the uptick in recidivism rates that can occur when a state enacts more punitive 
reentry policies, and the subsequent decline in recidivism rates that results from a shift to policies 
that encourage rehabilitation for released offenders. The other two states I analyzed for which 
there were recidivism data before and after a policy change—California and Massachusetts—
also exhibited decreases in their recidivism rates after allowing greater access to public benefits 
for drug felons. On the other hand, the states for which ban policy stayed consistent—Alabama, 
Indiana, and New York—demonstrated recidivism rates that increased or decreased slightly 
within a narrow range, remaining relatively constant over time. Because there is not data that 
predates the implementation of these policies (for Alabama and Indiana, pre-implementation of 
the full bans, and for New York, pre-repeal of the ban), it is difficult to determine whether the 
status of the ban contributed to these trends, or if they resulted from other factors.  
 These results thus suggest that expanding public assistance access for released drug 
felons may be correlated with declines in recidivism rates. Data from New York serves as a 
possible counterpoint to this conclusion, because in the absence of either ban, recidivism rates 
did not decrease. However, at the very least, it does not appear that lenient TANF and SNAP 
accessibility policies lead to an increase in recidivism rates over time.  
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B. Data Accessibility 
 This research project, in addition to illuminating the particular issue of recidivism, 
demonstrated broader issues with the accessibility of criminal justice data. Recidivism data is 
regularly collected by the federal government and most state governments, yet it is made difficult 
to access and analyze, if it is made publicly available at all. Throughout my data collection 
process, this seemed to be true of criminal justice data generally as well, although slightly less so 
for figures on general prison populations and their characteristics. The difficulty of finding 
aggregate data is also surprising given that individual prisoner information and people’s criminal 
records are often public record and much more easily accessed. Consequently, this research also 
highlights the larger issue that aggregate criminal justice data, which should be publicly 
accessible, is often deliberately made unavailable, difficult to access, and/or presented in formats 
that make it difficult to analyze.  
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VIII. Conclusion 
  Our current criminal justice system often creates a vicious cycle for those who have the 
misfortune of interacting with it. At a baseline level, all the states in my data and analysis—
regardless of TANF and SNAP policy—demonstrated some of the current failings of the 
criminal justice system. The states with the best recidivism outcomes had rates in the 20-30% 
range, meaning that even in the best case scenario, a quarter of people released from prison will 
return in three years. Most states had rates far higher than that.  
 With that in mind, the goal of this research was to shed some light on one of the sources 
of this often-overlooked issue. The nature of the data made a multivariate analysis difficult, and 
thus the results of that analysis did not provide much perspective as to whether enforcing or 
opting out of the SNAP and TANF bans for drug felons affected states’ recidivism rates. 
However, in looking specifically at certain states, I was able to identify a potential correlation 
between opting out of the SNAP and TANF bans (either fully or partially) and subsequent 
declines in recidivism rates.  
 Ideally, future research on this issue would include more complete data on US 
recidivism, as well as the use at least some of the controls I highlighted in this thesis to isolate 
the effects of public assistance accessibility on rates of return to incarceration. A wide array of 
factors can affect recidivism rates, including state racial demographics, general economic 
conditions, and social spending, as well as other policies more specifically related to the criminal 
justice system. For instance, greater parole leniency—such that a parole violation results in 
reinstatement of parole rather than re-incarceration—would lead to a decline in the number of 
people who are returning to prison after release. Further, the recent wave of criminal justice 
reform efforts has meant that policy changes do not occur in isolation; rather, allowing offenders 
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access to public assistance is often accompanied by other liberal changes to criminal justice 
policy, such as greater leniency in sentencing and parole. As such, it is difficult to isolate the 
particular effect of the PRWORA policy that I chose to study, but my results also suggest that 
other reforms to criminal justice may be interacting in such a way as to produce reductions in 
incarceration and recidivism rates over time.  
 Finally, a ban on access to SNAP and TANF benefits for released drug felons raises 
ethical questions about public assistance policy, which were not necessarily within the scope of 
this paper to address. Still, I want to note that criminal justice policy should not only aim to 
improve measurable outcomes—crime rates, criminal justice spending, incarceration and 
recidivism rates, etc.—but should also consider the ethical and societal ramifications of laws like 
PROWRA. My results suggest that recidivism is related to the status of ban implementation; this 
is an important suggestion, but even if it were not the case, it is vital to consider how those 
attempting to reenter society may be further marginalized by the inaccessibility of public 
benefits. Reducing recidivism rates should be a goal not just because of prison overcrowding or 
the expenses of incarceration, but also because our criminal justice system should—and 
purportedly already strives to—rehabilitate people and ensure that they will be able to reenter 
and participate meaningfully in society upon release.  
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